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I. RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS OMITS IMPORTANT FACTS 
AND RELIES ON FACTS WHICH WERE NOT BEFORE THE CSC WHEN 
IT DECIDED THIS CASE. 
The Deputies' statement of facts in many instances omits important facts. The 
Deputies cite the Court not to the record of the Career Service Council(CSC), but to a 
statement of facts submitted by the Deputies to the District Court. 
For example, while the position of shift supervisor was a ranked first line supervisor 
position, it was not within the department generally as claimed by the Deputies. Resp. Br. 
p. 3. The Deputies' Exhibit N, indicates that shift supervisors existed only in the Jail, 
Warrants and Civil divisions of the department. R. 855. The Deputies allege that the shift 
supervisor position was reclassified as a sergeant position. Resp. Br. 3,4. The Court of 
Appeals reciting the facts in the light most favorable to the CSC decision indicates the shift 
supervisor position was eliminated. Alexanderson. ^ 2. The CSC also found in paragraph 2 
of its decision that the shift supervisor position was eliminated. 
In the discussion of job related minimum qualifications (Resp. Br., p. 5), the Deputies 
fail to distinguish between County Personnel Rules and Regulations, and Jail Policies and 
Procedures. The qualifications from Exhibit 1C, R. 911-913, are from County Job 
Descriptions. Promotion procedures and shift supervisor experience were contained in the 
Jail Policies and Procedures Manual, not County Personnel rules or job descriptions. R 834. 
There also is no evidence that the shift supervisor experience requirement existed in any 
other division of the Sheriffs department. Whether the jail sergeant promotion policies in 
the Jail manual were in force before or after the elimination of the shift supervisor position 
has been an issue raised by County since the CSC hearing. These Jail policies contradict 
County Personnel Rules and Regulations or County approved minimum job qualifications. 
The reference to the memorandum rescinding the Jail Policies and Procedures(Resp. 
Br. 6.) was not in the CSC record since it happened in 1998 over a year after the CSC 
decision. In fact, the entire Jail Policies and Procedures Manual was rescinded in 1998 
because Utah County had constructed a new jail with a different operating philosophy. 
It is true that as a result of a request of the Deputies' Association written examination 
and oral interviews were not conducted in the 1991 and other promotions. R 908. The 
record further fails to support that length of service including correctional experience or shift 
supervisor experience was not considered. Resp. Br. 6. 
Also not supported are the claims that three of the four individuals promoted did not 
meet established minimum qualifications or other applicable advancement policies. Resp. 
Br. 6. All who were promoted in 1991 were POST certified. Deputy Howard was POST 
(Peace Officer Standards and Training) peace officer certified. Deputies Herkimer and Binks, 
were POST corrections officer certified. All held current POST certifications. Sergeant 
Binks completed peace officer certification in December of 1991, shortly before he was 
promoted. Deputies Herkimer and Binks further held college degrees and had corrections 
and shift supervisor experience. It was not certain whether Deputy Howard held a college 
degree and he had not been a shift supervisor. Whether the deputies promoted held required 
minimum qualifications, depends on a determination of whether the Jail Policies and 
Procedures stated minimum qualifications for promotion to sergeant. The three promoted 
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sergeants all met the minimum requirements contained in the Utah County Job Description 
for jail sergeant.(Exhibit 1C) The Deputies further failed to point out that Dennis Howard 
had been a corrections officer in the jail. Resp. Br. 7. 
The Deputies assert Deputy Martin trained those promoted over him to the rank of 
sergeant. The testimony in the record is that Deputy Martin advised only Sergeant Howard. 
There would have been no reason for Deputy Martin to train Deputies Herkimer and Binks 
who were both previously shift supervisors and had more shift supervisor experience than 
Deputy Martin. There further is no evidence in the record that Deputy Martin trained 
Sergeant Pientka, who was an administrative jail sergeant prior to the 1991 promotions. 
The Deputies alleged informal complaints and alleged assurances that their concerns 
would be addressed internally and that they would ultimately be promoted to the rank of 
sergeant (Resp. Br. 9) are further not supported by the record. Only three conversations 
between the Deputies and their supervisors are in the record, none of which promised 
promotion or occurred within a limitation period. As none of the alleged conversations can 
be placed within a limitation period, the Deputies could not rely upon these assurances and 
did not so rely in not asserting their rights. The Deputies claim that eligibility requirements 
fluctuated widely, however, the deputies were never prohibited from participating in a 
sergeants promotion. Resp. Br. 10. 
The Deputies further failed to quote Sheriff Bateman correctly regarding his statement 
from December, 1996 that he would investigate this matter and if he was able to determine 
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that their allegations were accurate that he would do what he could to make it right. Resp. 
Br. 10, R. 710. 
Further not in the record is the date the Deputies learned of the conversation of Mike 
Morgan with a patrol lieutenant. This date was alleged for the first time by the Deputies in 
briefing this matter before the District Court. Resp. Br. 10. This conversation concerned a 
promotion to Deputy III in which the Deputies did not participate and is not relevant to this 
matter. Resp. Br. 10, 11. 
The December 30th, 1996 letter from Sheriff Bateman was not in the record when the 
CSC made its decision. Resp. Br. 11. The Deputies also failed to point out that Sheriff 
Bateman in his December 30th, 1996 letter also indicated that the Deputies had been given 
consideration for their experience as shift supervisors. R.340. As is shown by Exhibit N, all 
positions in the department were "ranked". R 855. 
The reference to inconsistencies referred to in Sheriff Bateman's December 1996 
letter refers to nothing more than differences in promotional processes from one process to 
the next, i.e. whether testing was or was not implemented. However, Sheriff Bateman was 
not given the opportunity to testify on this letter as it was not discussed or introduced at the 
CSC hearing. 
The Deputies cite that the CSC did not award attorney's fees in an attempt through 
footnote 5 on page 14 of their brief to reserve the right to seek attorney's fees. However, the 
CSC attorney's fees decision was not cross appealed by the Deputies and the Deputies have 
lost the right to pursue attorney's fees. 
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In reference to replacing Mr. Beuhring before the CSC entered findings, as a result 
of the Deputies motion to dismiss the District Court remanded this matter to the CSC for 
entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in October of 1997. The CSC requested the 
parties to present proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and objections thereto 
which the parties completed in May of 1998. Mr. Beuhring's term on the CSC expired June 
30th of 1998. He was not replaced until some three months later in October of 1998, a year 
after the case had been remanded. Why Mr. Beuhring did not adopt the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law submitted by the Deputies months before he was replaced after his term 
expired is unknown. If the facts are clear and uncontroverted and capable of supporting only 
a finding in favor of the judgment, why did not the CSC enter the proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law submitted by the Deputies before Mr. Beuhring was replaced. 
The Deputies also incorrectly claim credit for advising the CSC that it had erroneously 
ruled that further review was de novo under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The 
Deputies opposed County's Motion for Reconsideration which advised the CSC that the 
Administrative Procedures Act did not apply. 
The Deputies also referred to the affidavit of Mr Beuhring filed with the District Court 
on September 8th, 2000 for a District Court hearing on which CSC order would be reviewed. 
This affidavit was signed in July of 2000, held and not filed until shortly before the 
September 12th, 2000 hearing. This affidavit is not relevant to the issues before this Court 
and is an attempt to sway the court with inflammatory arguments. The District Court did not 
rely on this affidavit nor was County given an adequate opportunity to respond to it. The 
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court stated on September 12, 2000 that it would disregard the subsequent CSC orders and 
review the June 1997 CSC ruling. 
The September 12, 2000 minute entry was made after briefing and argument by the 
parties on the issue of which CSC ruling was binding. After determining that the District 
Court would review the June 1997 decision, all issues were briefed, including the timeliness 
issue. The irony of the delay and procedural issues created by remand is that they arose 
because the Deputies requested the court to dismiss the County's appeal so the CSC could 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The Deputies also failed to point out that the final appealable order of the District 
Court granting the Petition for Extraordinary Relief dismissed the Deputies' claims for 
limitation of actions grounds and contained nothing else. 
The Deputies statement of facts omits many important facts and relies on facts not 
before the CSC. 
II. COUNTY HAS CORRECTLY FRAMED THE ISSUES BEFORE THE 
COURT, 
Though the Court on Certiorari usually reviews the decisions of the Court of Appeals, 
in this case the Court should directly review the CSC decision for several reasons. This 
matter comes before the Court as an extraordinary writ under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
65B. Regarding review of Rule 65B writs, the Court of Appeals has previously stated 
This court looks at the administrative proceeding as if the petition were brought here 
directly, even though technically it is the district court's decision that is being 
appealed....Since the review performed by the district court under Rule 65B is a 
review of the entire record, it is the same review that would have been afforded if the 
matter were raised as a direct appeal....We give no deference to the district court's 
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initial appellate review since it was a review of the record which this court is just as 
capable of reviewing as the district court. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 
P2d23, 26(Utah App. 1991): Alexanderson. If 7. 
The Supreme Court should, because this matter is brought under Rule 65B, review 
this matter under the same procedure as the Court of Appeals, exercising the same review 
that would have been afforded if the matter were raised as a direct appeal, giving no 
deference to the District Court or the Court of Appeals prior appellate review, as this Court 
is just as capable of reviewing this case as the District Court and Court of Appeals. 
Further, the Court of Appeals in several instances did not address County's arguments 
in the body of the opinion, as for instance application of the Renn v. Utah State Board of 
Pardons, 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995) gross and flagrant standard, remand and whether the 
Deputies knew of their grievance in 1991. The Court rejected the arguments by stating it 
would apply the Renn standard, referenced footnotes, or failed to address the arguments 
altogether. As the Court of Appeals presented no reasoned argument in the body of the 
opinion, County should not be required to frame the issues in light of the Court of Appeals 
opinion. 
III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND REMAND ISSUES ARE APPELLATE 
ISSUES AND ARE ADDRESSED IN LIGHT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
DECISION. 
The Court certified three questions to be heard in this matter. First, was the gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion standard properly applied. Second, did the Deputies timely file 
their grievance with the CSC, and third, should the case have been remanded by the Court 
of Appeals to the District Court. The first and third issues are appellate issues which arose 
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only because of the decision of the Court of Appeals and are addressed in light of the Court 
of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals was the only court to apply the Renn standard 
and the issue of remand arose at the Court of Appeals level. The first and third issues have 
been argued and framed in terms of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
IV. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, COUNTY'S FAILURE TO FRAME THE ISSUES 
IN LIGHT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION IS HARMLESS 
ERROR AS THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION SHOULD BE 
REVERSED FOR THE SAME REASONS THE CAREER SERVICE 
COUNCIL DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. Standard of Review 
Though the specific facts of this case will not recur in the future, this case will 
determine the important question of whether the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion 
standard is applied to all 65B(d)(2)(A) writs. The standard of review applied will determine 
the outcome of future actions. 
In Petitioner's Brief, pp. 14-21, County argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
applying the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard on the grounds that application 
of the standard stated in Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995) is 
limited to cases where appeal is prohibited by statute only if there is a gross and flagrant 
abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted. The instant appeal 
was provided for by statute and the Renn standard should not be applied in this case or others 
for several reasons. The Renn standard is contrary to the clear abuse of discretion language 
in the Rules 65B(d), prevents the Rule 65B(d)(4) review of whether the lower court regularly 
pursued its authority which includes correct application of the law, the CSC is not a policy-
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making body entitled to deference, and application of the Renn standard in this case would 
result in differing standards of review between municipal civil service commissions and 
county career service councils. 
The cases cited by the Deputies are distinguishable. State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 
(Utah App. 1998) and Dean v. Henroid. 1999 UT App 056, 975 P.2d 946 are cases where 
appeal was prohibited by statute. Indian Village Trading Post Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367 
(Utah Court of App. 1996) was decided on other grounds. The application of Renn to all rule 
65B writs by the Court of Appeals has made the exception the rule. It is significant that the 
Court of Appeals in upholding its application of the Renn standard to all extraordinary writs 
cites to its own interpretations of Renn and not Renn itself. 
It is clear that the paramount issue is to draw a line preventing a Rule 65B writ from 
becoming a vehicle to circumvent appeals prohibited by statute. The Renn Court ruled that 
only where the lower Court committed a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and 
fundamental principles of fairness were flouted, would the Court review a matter if appeal 
is statutorily prohibited. 
The Court of Appeals determination that the Deputies did not know of their cause of 
action until Sheriff Bateman's December 1996 letter is a gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion since the determination is based on an irrelevant factor, whether the shift 
supervisor position was "ranked", which was improperly admitted by the CSC after this 
matter was remanded for findings and conclusions which were never entered. 
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Contrary to the Deputies assertions, County does not argue that the Court should 
engage in de novo review. The Tolman case sets the correct standard of review for career 
service council decisions, reviewing factual determinations under the clearly erroneous 
standard and reviewing the application of the law for correctness. Pet. Br. p. 21, Tolman at 
26. 
Applying the Renn standard to all writs also results in constitutional violations which 
are properly before this Court. Because the District Court first addressed and rejected 
applying the Renn standard in this case, County requests the Court to uphold the District 
Court's rejection of the application of the Renn standard in this instance on other 
constitutional grounds. "An appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper 
grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground." DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 
428, 444 (Utah 1995). The Court of Appeals application of the Renn standard to all Rule 
65B writs violates due process, fundamental fairness, and access to the courts by preventing 
litigants of notice and a fair hearing by being thoroughly apprized of the law to be applied 
by the lower court and the reviewing court. Despite years in court the determinative, key 
issue in this case, the 1991 minimum qualifications for jail sergeant and whether the 
promoted deputies met these qualifications has not been decided by any court, prohibiting 
County from having it's claims and defenses properly adjudicated on the merits according 
to the facts and the law. 
The Deputies arguments regarding the County's constitutional allegations are 
misplaced. The County in no way contends that the State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 
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sliding scale standard of review is unconstitutional. Nor does the County argue that 
deference to a trail court's findings of fact should in any way be disturbed or that de novo 
review should be the only option for review of a lower court's decision or that applying an 
abuse of discretion standard to a lower court's ruling violates due process or the open courts 
provision. But making the Renn exception the rule does violate due process and the open 
courts provisions. 
The CSC's application of the law should be reviewed for correctness since the CSC 
is a volunteer, lay body, the limitation of actions issue presents complex and novel issues, 
and the CSC is interpreting Utah County Personnel Rules and Regulations. More deference 
to a trial court's or agency determination of law may be granted in other settings such as an 
administrative agency charged with enacting and enforcing rules. However, this is not the 
case with a career service council which neither makes nor enforces rules. 
If the Renn standard applies, it is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion to expand 
a limitation period from three months to five years and to base that expansion on evidence 
not in the CSC record. Further, because the key determination in this case has never been 
made, fundamental issues of fairness have been flouted. 
B. Limitation of Actions 
The second issue certified is whether the Deputies timely filed their grievance. 
Framed in reference to the Court of Appeals decision, it improperly concluded that the 
Deputies first knew or should have know of their grievance in December, 1996. 
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The Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled, as did the CSC, that the Deputies discussion 
with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing and 
that implicit in this determination is a factual finding that the Deputies were not reasonably 
aware of their grievance until their December 1996 discussion with Sheriff Bateman. 
Alexanderson, *| 9, 10. This finding is clearly erroneous for several reasons. First because 
the Jail Policies and Procedures Manual Sections 150 and 127 did not set minimum 
qualifications for jail sergeant. Pet. Br. pp. 22-34. Utah County argued below to the CSC 
and the District Court that the Jail Policies and Procedures regarding testing for jail sergeant 
and/or a minimum qualifications for jail sergeant did not override Personnel job description 
minimum qualifications. The Deputies must reach to Jail Policies and Procedures and not 
County Personnel Department Policies and Procedures to support their arguments. The 
Deputies cannot establish their cause of action if Jail Policies and Procedures do not override 
personnel job descriptions. The minimum qualifications for jail sergeant and whether the 
promoted Deputies satisfied them are the key facts. 
Second, the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action within the 
limitation period after they were not hired. Pet. Br. pp. 34-41; 54-59. Even if this Court does 
not determine the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant and assumes or finds that the Jail 
Policies and Procedures set testing requirements and minimum qualifications, the Deputies 
knew, should have known, and were on inquiry notice of their cause of action when they 
were not promoted in 1991. The Court of Appeals statement of the facts, cited in the light 
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most favorable to the CSC decision, states facts which determine that the Deputies were on 
inquiry notice in 1991 and did nothing. 
Because the duties of sergeant were similar to those of shift supervisor, and based on 
representations made to them by management, the Deputies believed they would be 
promoted to sergeant. Both Deputies requested to be considered for the sergeant 
positions. In December 1991, the department made its hiring decisions and neither 
deputy was promoted. 
Although the Deputies were qualified for the sergeant position, some of those 
who were promoted to sergeant as the Council later found, did not meet minimum 
qualification requirements. The Deputies suspected that several of those promoted 
were not qualified, but the Deputies claim they did not have access to sufficient 
eligibility lists and did not at that time investigate further or pursue formal grievances. 
Alexanderson, ^ 2,3. 
The Deputies participated in promotion processes, knew who was promoted, 
suspected individuals who were not qualified were promoted, and had access to all relevant 
rules and regulations. It is clearly erroneous to find that the Deputies did not know or could 
not have known of their grievance at the time of the 1991 promotions. As the Deputies 
sought promotion, the key facts that put them on inquiry notice were that they were not 
promoted and that they suspected that those who were promoted did not possess minimum 
qualifications. 
The Deputies do not argue if they knew or should have known of their cause of action 
in 1991 because the facts are clear from their own statements that they knew or should have 
known of their cause of action when they were not promoted in the 1991. (And subsequent 
promotions if in fact the Jail Policies and Procedures applied after elimination of the shift 
supervisor position. The Jail Policies and Procedures are clearly not applicable to any other 
part of the department.) The defendants knew or should have known of their grievance when 
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they were not promoted in 1991 and having failed to timely complain, the grievance that they 
should have been promoted in 1991 is therefore barred. 
Third, because Sheriff Bateman's letter containing the statement relied on by the 
Court of Appeals for finding the deputies were not aware of their grievance until 1996 was 
not in the record when the CSC made its June 1997 decision. Pet Br. p. 39, 41. The 
statements in Sheriff Bateman's December 1996 letter, that shift supervisors were not 
automatically promoted to sergeant because the position of shift supervisor was never a 
ranked position, was not in the CSC record when the CSC decided this matter. Sheriff 
Bateman's December 30th letter to the Deputies was not introduced into the record until June 
of 1998. The CSC not even having considered the December 30th letter where the ranked 
statement was made could not have had " . . . reason to believe the Deputies were not 
reasonably aware of their employment grievance until December of 1996." Alexanderson, 
T| 11. As the CSC ruled that the December 17,1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman drove the 
time for filing and not his statement in the December 30, 1996 letter, the Court of Appeals 
improperly upheld the CSC on other grounds not established in the record. Salt Lake County 
v. Metro West Ready Mix. Inc. 2004 UT 23,1f 21. 
Fourth, whether the Deputies were "ranked" is not relevant to the minimum 
qualifications question or whether they should have been promoted. Pet. Br. p. 39, 41. 
Whether shift supervisors were ranked is not a minimum qualification necessary foi 
promotion to sergeant. There are no policies, rules or regulations that provide that whethei 
they were "ranked" is a requirement for promotion to sergeant or that required promotion 
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because shift supervisor was a ranked position. Learning whether the Sheriff considered the 
Deputies as ranked is not an occurrence or an element of their cause of action. Even if being 
ranked were relevant, it is at best the belated discovery of a legal theory long after their cause 
of action lapsed. Pet. Br. p. 37. 
Sheriff Bateman's misunderstanding regarding shift supervisors was harmless error 
in light of the fact that in the same letter he indicates that the Deputies were given adequate 
consideration for their experience as shift supervisors. R 340, 341. As can be seen from 
Exhibit N, all positions in the department were ranked. Alexanderson, Tf 4. If whether the 
Deputies were ranked is relevant, the appropriate remedy would be to set aside the 
promotions giving the Deputies consideration as ranked deputies. 
Fifth, the discovery of possible corruption unrelated to the Deputies would not give 
rise to an actionable grievance for promotion or hiring processes they were not involved in. 
Pet. Br. p. 38,39. The Court of Appeals relied on a discovery alleged to have occurred in 
December 1996 of possible unfairness in a promotional process unrelated to the Deputies. 
The date of this discovery is not in the CSC record and was alleged by the Deputies for the 
first time when this matter was briefed before the District Court. This also amounts to 
upholding the CSC on other grounds improperly in the record. 
Sixth, the Court of Appeals intimates that the CSC could deviate from the three month 
limitation of actions as a reasonable and rational departure from an agency's own rules. 
Alexanderson, fn. 7. The Court of Appeals indicates that the CSC is a body charged with 
hearing employment grievances, but then attributes to them rule-making authority similar to 
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the Public Service Commission. Alexanderson,^j 5, fn. 7. This may be true were the CSC 
a rule making agency subject to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Union Pacific R.R. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n 842 P.2d 876(Utah 1992)(upholding an agency interpretation of 
its own rule with two plausible constructions), cited by the Court of Appeals, is a case 
interpreting whether under UAPA an agency's action was contrary to it's own rule. The 
Court of Appeals erroneously assumes that Section VII.E.l of the Utah County Office of 
Personnel Management Rules and Regulations is a CSC rule. The 3 month limitation of 
actions is promulgated by the County pursuant to the County Personnel Management Act and 
is a County Personnel Department rule, not a CSC rule. The interpretation of the rule is not 
at issue as the 3 month limitation does not give rise to differing constructions. It is the 
application of a clear rule that is at issue in this case, not the interpretation of a rule with two 
plausible constructions. The CSC has no authority to disregard County's three month 
limitation of actions. Alexanderson, ^ | 9. A deviation from three months to almost five years 
is not slight as characterized by the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals then relies on evidence not before the CSC (alleged 
improprieties and Sheriff Batemans' letter) to determine that the departure was reasonable 
and rational. The departure is not reasonable and rational as the Deputies knew or should 
have known of their cause of action long before the 1991 discussion with Sheriff Bateman. 
The fact that promotional procedures may have been arbitrary does not justify promotion of 
complaining individuals. The only finding that could allow for promotion would be that the 
Deputies were the only qualified deputies available for sergeant promotion in 1991. 
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The Court of Appeals reliance on the CSC's finding that some employees were 
promoted to the sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in the various 
policies was stated in the context of promotions from 1991 through 1997. Unless the 'some5 
includes the three deputies promoted to jail sergeant in 1991, this reliance is insufficient. 
This statement was also made in the CSC decision in the context of relief under 
implementation of standardized and unbiased testing, not retroactive reinstatement and 
appropriate reparations. 
The Court of Appeals decision would have been different if the proper standard of 
review had been applied. Evidence in the record and contained in the factual statement of 
the Court of Appeals shows that the Deputies were at least on inquiry notice and had a duty 
of due diligence to investigate their claims and did nothing. The Deputies either knew or 
should have known, of their cause of action long before their meeting with Sheriff Bateman 
some five years later. County's marshaling shows that it is clearly erroneous to find that the 
defendants first knew of their cause of action in December of 1996. The facts marshaled in 
support of a determination that the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of 
action when they were not promoted in 1991 come largely from their own statements and 
arguments. The Court of Appeals and the Deputies completely avoided the question of 
whether there was sufficient evidence in 1991 to find that the Deputies knew or should have 
known of their cause of action. The Deputies clearly felt they were wronged and believed 
they were the only Deputies qualified for promotion to jail sergeant in 1991. The Deputies 
knew the key facts when they were not promoted in 1991, that someone else was promoted 
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who they suspected did not meet minimum qualifications. Deputy Martin worked with 
Deputy Howard in the jail and the Deputies were both acquainted with Deputies Herkimer 
and Binks, who were their fellow shift supervisors. If the Deputies did not have actual 
notice, they were certainly on inquiry notice and failed to exercise due diligence. At best 
Sheriff Bateman's December 1996 letter is a belated discovery of a new legal theory that is 
insufficient to recommence a lapsed limitation period. Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds 
Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 579(Utah App. 1996). 
The Deputies continue to advance that the promotional process was corrupt and 
illegal, though no court to date has adopted this position. Neither the CSC, District Court 
nor the Court of Appeals adopted these arguments. There is only one allegation of a 
promotional irregularity, that of the unrelated and "unsuccessful" incident concerning a 
patrol position. There is no evidence of any illegal conduct. There is no hint of corruption 
or any illegality in any opinion issued by the lower courts despite the many and varied 
allegations of the Deputies. The Court of Appeals decision and the CSC ruling do not 
contain even a hint of concealment alleged by the Deputies. The record does not support the 
alleged corruption, illegality or "affirmative measures of concealment" which the Deputies 
allege. 
The Sheriffs statement about "inconsistencies" is also not determinative and does 
not form the basis of a cause of action. This phrase was used only in the context that 
promotion procedures had varied between promotional processes and is not an admission of 
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wrong doing. In any event, this evidence was not before the CSC when it made its ruling and 
should not be considered by the Court in reviewing the Court of Appeals opinion. 
If the Court determines that the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause 
of action when they were not hired in 1991 and subsequent promotional processes, there is 
no need to reach the County's arguments on the discovery rule. Pet. Br. p. 59-69. The 
Deputies cannot show and do not argue that the County fraudulently concealed any key facts, 
that there are exceptional circumstances excusing the Deputies' failure to file a grievance or 
any circumstances which would allow the Deputies to rely on estoppel or any form of the 
discovery rule. 
Any delay in this case is squarely upon the Deputies who though on inquiry notice, 
did not pursue their grievances for five years. There is no evidence of concealment of Sheriff 
Bateman' s understanding regarding the shift supervisor being ranked or unranked or that this 
understanding is even relevant to the promotion of the Deputies. There was no concealment 
of the testing processes as the Deputies participated in the tests and knew the processes and 
publishing eligibility lists would not be helpful to determine the qualifications of promoted 
deputies as eligibility lists did not contain minimum qualifications. See eligibility roster 
Exhibit 16. R 873, 874. The Deputies did not ask why they were not promoted and the 
claimed repeated assurances are simply general allegations without any basis in fact. 
C. Remand 
The third issue, whether the case should have been remanded, concerns a decision first 
made by the Court of Appeals, and the arguments are framed in light of that decision. The 
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Court of Appeals should have remanded this matter because there was no appellate decision 
on the merits of this case. The District Court Memorandum Decision addressed only testing 
procedures, the remedy for a violation of which would be to repeat the testing and not 
promote the complaining participants. The District Court however made no findings relevant 
to the merits which would have supported a ruling promoting the Deputies to sergeant, that 
deputies promoted to Jail Sergeants in 1991 did not meet minimum qualifications or other 
issues on the merits raised by County below. 
The only statement regarding qualifications made by the CSC in Part 3 of its June 30th, 
1997 decision is "Evidence supported the fact that some employees were promoted to the 
sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in the various policies". This 
statement was made in the context of reviewing sergeants' promotions within and without 
the jail from 1991 through 1996. This statement is too vague to support granting the 
Deputies5 back pay and ordering immediate promotion. The only finding that would allow 
those remedies would be that Bonnie Herkimer, Mark Binks, and Dennis Howard, promoted 
in 1991 to jail sergeant, did not meet minimum qualifications. These facts have never been 
addressed squarely by any court and the CSC finding is an insufficient finding on which to 
promote the Deputies. It is also significant that this statement was made not in reference to 
reinstatement or back pay, but to implementation of standardized unbiased testing. County 
requests only that this case be remanded to the District Court on the merits to address the 
minimum qualifications for j ail sergeant in 1991 and County's other unaddressed meritorious 
arguments. 
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The Deputies further confuse promotional processes repeatedly with minimum 
qualifications. The remedy for defective promotional process would be to repeat the process 
correctly, not promote the deputies who complained. Reliance on the CSC ruling that testing 
procedures were inconsistent and involved subjective criteria is not relevant to the 
determination of whether the Deputies should have been promoted in 1991. County admits 
that the processes varied from one process to the next, having foregone competitive testing 
at the request of the Deputies' Association. R 908. County does not wish to relitigate this 
issue. However, the issue of minimum qualifications and the County's other arguments have 
not been and should be addressed by the District Court. The question of whether Jail Policies 
and Procedures can supercede County Personnel Rules and Regulations has not been and 
should be addressed. This case should be remanded to the District Court for a decision on 
the merits. 
This case should also be remanded as the District Court's final order, which the 
Deputies did not object to, dismisses the case on statute of limitations grounds only. The 
District Court's discussion of merit principles was dicta unnecessary to its decision. Having 
determined that the case is barred by the limitation of actions, there was no need to address 
or comment on the merits of the case. 
There was no need for the County to cross appeal the District Court's final order when 
all the order did was dismiss the case for failure to timely file. The only issue before the 
Court of Appeals was the limitation of actions determination. The order appealed from did 
not contain any reference to the merits of this matter. There was nothing in the District 
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Court's final order, based on limitation of actions grounds only, for the County to cross 
appeal. County supposes at this juncture, if County had cross appealed the merits, the 
Deputies would be arguing that the merits were not before the Court because the final order 
did not address them. It is the final order of the District Court and not the Memorandum 
Decision that is appealed. If the findings had been made in the body of the final order, they 
would have been subject to cross appeal. This case should be remanded for review of the 
merits on the record. 
County is not requesting that this case be remanded to the CSC for factual findings. 
If the Deputies5 grievance was timely, County's request for remand at page 50 of its Appeal 
Brief in the Court of Appeals, footnote 3, is to remand this case to the District Court to 
review the merits of the issues not addressed by the District Court as the District Court 
clearly only reached promotion procedures and not minimum qualifications or County's other 
meritorious arguments. 
The Deputies' argue that if the case were remanded now, there would not be sufficient 
evidence upon which any adjudicative body could make a ruling on the merits. This is an 
admission by the Deputies that County suffered prejudice by the Deputies' delay in bringing 
their grievances. The Deputies acknowledge that when this case was tried it had aged to the 
point where it could not be properly determined by quoting Petitioners Brief pp. 65,66. At 
the time this case was tried, the state of available evidence was indeed bleak. Resp. Br. p. 
44. However, County is asking for remand for review on the record, not for taking further 
evidence. 
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The Court of Appeals failure to remand also results in constitutional violations argued 
in Petitioner's Brief pp. 69-74. These arguments are properly before the Court as these 
violations are appellate issues arising because the Court of Appeals did not remand this case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, the Court should determine that the Renn standard of review 
is not applicable to this case. The Court should review this matter for an abuse of discretion, 
reviewing the application of the law for correctness, employing a clearly erroneous standard 
as to findings of fact. Applying this standard, the Court should determine that the Court of 
Appeals erred when it determined that the Deputies did not learn of their cause of action until 
1996, as the Deputies knew, should have known, and at the least were on inquiry notice when 
they were not promoted in 1991. 
In the alternative, should the Court employ the Renn standard, as the Court of Appeals 
upheld the CSC on other grounds improperly in the record, the Court should determine that 
it was a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion to find the Deputies grievance was timely by 
relying on evidence not before the CSC. 
Finally, should the court determine this matter was brought in a timely manner, this 
matter should be remanded to the District Court for a decision on County's meritorious 
arguments. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 2004. /} 
M. Cort Griffin ^ \\\[ 
Attorney for Petitioner ^ 
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